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1 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Basel Capital Accords have been observed and implemented by banks throughout 
the world, although produced and formulated by a body which possesses no law 
making authority. Due to a lack of binding force the work of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision is regarded as recommendations only and implemented and 
complied with on a voluntary basis. Against the backdrop of the recent global 
economic crisis and the development of banking supervision, I aim to come to a 
conclusion as to the nature of the Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards: A Revised Framework (Basel II), through a comparison between various 
possibilities of classification. The investigation of the legal nature and possible 
classification of Basel II is of significance as there is no real certainty  regarding its 
current legal nature, except that it is a non-binding accord considered to be “soft law”. 
A further investigation will be performed on the development of banking supervision 
in the United States of America, South Africa and the United Kingdom and the impact 
of Basel II on each of these jurisdictions. A comparative study will be conducted 
which focuses primarily on the measures of implementation and impact which Basel 
II has had on the countries under consideration.  The role which Basel II played in the 
recent world economic crisis deserves discussion due to the great impact that was felt 
by the banking industry on a global level, in particular the role which Basel II 
possibly played in the economic impacts felt by the United States of America, South 
Africa and the United Kingdom. By this study I wish to achieve clarity on the role 
which Basel II plays, its impact on banking law as a whole, as well as its nature. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background 
As a component of banking supervision, the 1988 Basel Capital Accord and the 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised 
Framework (hereafter referred to as the Basel Capital Accords) have been applied and 
implemented widely in the banking industry as a form of convergence of international 
banking regulation and have been observed in numerous countries as global best 
practice in the supervising of banks. The Basel Capital Accords have been seen as 
extremely influential although regarded as “soft law”, which is non-binding with no 
formal legal status or authority to bind the countries who subscribe to their principles. 
 
The role of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereafter referred to as the 
Basel Committee) is significant within the banking industry globally, having 
produced significant recommendations on best practice which contributed to the 
development of banking supervision on an international level. The impact of the 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised 
Framework (hereafter referred to as Basel II) can be seen in the wide recognition 
which the work of the committee has received in the banking industry and in the 
application and  importation of the principles of Basel II into domestic legal systems 
by banking supervisors. A large majority of banking supervisors have made 
compliance with the principles of Basel II compulsory within their respective 
countries, thereby concretising the recommendations. 
 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Although the Basel Capital Accords have been acknowledged and widely observed 
throughout the world, not only by banking supervisors of countries who are members 
of the Basel Committee, the question exists as to what Basel II is, with reference to 
the contents and nature of its framework. 
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Consideration of the development of banking supervision globally, with reference to 
the previous capital accord, and the specific impacts thereof is required in order to 
arrive at a point of clarity with regard to the nature of Basel II. Consideration of the 
nature of the Basel II should be done in conjunction with an investigation of the 
particular development of banking supervision and impact which Basel II has had on 
the banking industry in various jurisdictions. In particular the United States of 
America, South Africa and the United Kingdom will be considered.  
 
The banking industry was affected to a great extent by the world economic crisis 
which commenced in 2007 and Basel II deserves consideration within this context in 
this minor dissertation. A consideration of the recent world economic crisis will 
conclude the entire study as a practical analysis of whether Basel II was able to 
contribute in any way to the effects and economic impacts which were experienced by 
banks in the United States of America, South Africa and the United Kingdom during 
this time. 
 
1.3 Methods and procedures 
The aims of this study will be achieved through consideration of the development of 
banking supervision and the Basel Capital Accords, the state of banking supervision 
and the impact of Basel II on the United Kingdom, the United States of America and 
South Africa, the possible classification of Basel II and finally the role which Basel II 
played in the impacts felt by the mentioned countries during the world economic 
crisis. 
 
The development of banking supervision on a global level will be considered with 
reference to the origin of banking supervision and the Basel Committee, as well as a 
consideration of each of the Basel Capital Accords (Basel I and Basel II) and their 
introduction into the world banking industry. This investigation will be concluded by 
a brief consideration of what the Basel III recommendations will contain when 
finalised and released for implementation in the future. 
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The impact of the Basel Capital Accords will be assessed by way of studying the 
impact of the latest capital framework (Basel II) on the United States of America, 
South Africa and the United Kingdom through considering the development of 
banking supervision in each of these jurisdictions.  
 
In order to answer the question which relates to the legal nature of the latest Basel 
Capital Accord, Basel II, various possibilities of classification will be considered with 
reference to the validity requirements for each proposed classification and the position 
of each proposed classification within the law. In particular, the possible classification 
of Basel II as an agreement, treaty, international trade usage or a new lex mercatoria 
(new law merchant) will be considered. Finally, a comparison will be drawn between 
the legal nature of Basel II and the Uniform Customs and Practice of Documentary 
Credits (UCP 600) which applies to the issuing and use of letters of credit. 
 
In light of the recent global economic crisis, the role of Basel II in the impacts which 
were felt by the United States of America, South Africa and the United Kingdom will 
be considered.  
 
This minor dissertation will focus on general provisions and principles of Basel II and 
will not amount to an exposition of specific principals contained therein, except to the 
extent that such principles require consideration in assessing the nature and impact of 
Basel II. A detailed study of the specific principles of Basel II falls outside the scope 
of this minor dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND THE 
BASEL CAPITAL ACCORDS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The supervision of banks has become increasingly important over time, especially in 
light of the development of technology and globalisation. Banks do business with 
each other internationally making them susceptible to risk due to their monetary 
exposure to each other. Largely banking supervision has emerged in reaction to the 
risks which banking institutions are exposed to and represent the attempts of bank 
supervisors and banks to mitigate and prevent these risks from impacting them to such 
a great extent that they are declared insolvent. 
 
Banking on an international level is not only confined to large banks but also to 
smaller banks who have established relations internationally, including banks from 
developing countries, having the effect that banking operations internationally have 
become more complicated in terms of supervision and the maintenance of certain 
required standards.1 This shows that banking supervision is a discipline which is 
common to the business of any bank regardless of the size of the institution. 
 
In this chapter the development of banking supervision will be addressed with 
reference to the various Basel Capital Accords and the establishment of the Basel 
Committee. Various risks to the banking industry will be identified, with reference to 
the reasons for their existence as a precursor to considering the measures and 
procedures put in place to guard against these respective risks.  Future developments 
will be considered in light of the impending release of a further capital framework by 
the Basel Committee, which amounts to strengthening of capital requirements under 
Basel II. 
 
                                                 
1 Effros Current Issues Affecting Central Banks (1994) 331. 
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The establishment of the Basel Committee, as the institution driving banking 
supervision globally will be addressed and finally the products of the deliberations of 
the Basel Committee, Basel I and Basel II up to this point will be considered in light 
of the major causes for their formulation and application pointing out the major 
differences between them.  
 
Regulating banks is important to ensure a healthy financial system for stability and 
growth in any economy. The banking sector is more inclined to suffer crisis than any 
other sector in an economy, and are highly geared institutions.2 For this reason the 
banking industry requires specific and organised supervision and regulation. 
 
2.2 The development of banking supervision and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 
2.2.1 The Basel Committee on banking supervision 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was initially made up of central-bank 
Governors of the Group of Ten Countries.3 It was established in 1974 as a 
consequence of the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt in West Germany which contributed 
to significant instability in international currency and the banking market as a whole.4  
 
The Basel Committee is neither a national organisation of a specific country nor an 
official international regulatory agency.5 It has no legislative authority and the 
recommendations made by it are merely, recommendations on best practice. The key 
objective of the Basel Committee is to provide a forum for regular cooperation 
between members specifically on matters which relate to the supervision of banks and 
to improve the standards which are implemented by banks on an international level. 
The committee also identifies areas of poor regulation and risk to move towards a 
                                                 
2 Dam “The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and Comparative Perspectives” 
2010 Chicago Journal of International Law 1 25-26. 
3 The group of ten or G-10 countries are a group of countries which have agreed to take part in the 
General Amendments to Borrow (GAB) and include some of the most powerful countries in the 
world. 
4 “The history of the Basel Committee and its Membership” August 2009 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/historypdf (20-9-2010). 
5 Tarbert “Rethinking Capital Adequacy: the Basle Accord and the New Framework” 2001 Bus. Law 
767 767. 
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system where there is adequate supervision and where all banks are supervised 
appropriately internationally.6 
 
2.2.2 Banking Regulation 
Banking regulation and banking supervision are two components which are closely 
related, banking regulation refers to rules and banking supervision focuses on the 
enforcement of these rules.7 However the terms banking regulation and banking 
supervision are often used to describe the same concept.8   
 
Various techniques of prudential regulation have been developed over time involving 
measures which are aimed at being preventative in nature as well as techniques which 
are aimed at being protective in nature. Preventative regulatory techniques are 
typically procedures which aim to prevent a banking crisis by way of reducing the 
risks which affect banks. Protective regulatory techniques are a basis of support to 
banks in the event that a banking crisis threatens to manifest.9 
 
Taking into accountant the special role which a bank plays as a link between an 
investor of funds and his investment, and that various risks are unique to the business 
of banks, a real possibility exists that in the event of a bank failing, money supply to 
depositors would be placed in real jeopardy. Depositors’ money supply can be placed 
in jeopardy by a number of occurrences which include runs and panic.10  
  
Prudential supervision of banks requires that bank supervisors and management 
structures within banks put into place certain measures and procedures to counter 
risks which threaten banks and that they make provision for the adaptability of the 
measures in response to foreseeable eventualities. Supervision also intends to ensure 
                                                 
6 “The history of the Basel Committee and its Membership August 2009 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/historypdf (20-9-2010). 
7  Berger, Molyneux and Wilson The Oxford Handbook of Banking (2010) 315. 
8 Van Jaarsveld  “Domestic and International Banking Regulation and Supervision – Defying the 
Challenges” 2002 SALJ 71 71. 
9  Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2003) 82. 
10 A run on a bank is when a large number of depositors withdraw their deposits within a short period 
of time of each other, usually when they believe that the bank may be declared insolvent ; Van 
Jaarsveld  “Domestic and International Banking Regulation and Supervision – Defying the 
Challenges” 2002 SALJ 71 74. 
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that constant development of assessment techniques to assess the success of the 
management structures of banks in their assessment of risks are in place.11 
 
What is clear is that the supervision of banks on a prudential level is not only the 
responsibility of the structure or body which is tasked with ensuring that banking 
supervision is practiced and adhered to in a country, but that it is also the 
responsibility of the management structures within banks and even more so in their 
interest to ensure that effective mechanisms and procedures are in place to ensure that 
a bank is sufficiently protected against failure. In considering the duty of managers of 
banks it is of great importance that suitable and competent staff are recruited to 
achieve this goal. 
 
The good corporate governance within banks is also an aspect which contributes to 
financial stability.12 The reason why good corporate governance of banks is 
important, especially to the structures which are responsible for the supervision of 
banks, is because the supervision of banks is enhanced by the actions of the board of 
directors of banks as well as the managers of banks, who are in turn responsible for 
the implementation and maintenance of prudential supervisory systems and 
procedures within individual banks.13 
 
2.2.3 Banks versus traditional companies 
Banks play an integral role in all economies of the world, operating payment systems 
and fulfilling the role as a safe place for depositors to place their funds.14 The main 
business of banks is regarded as taking deposits from the general public which are 
normally repayable on demand. What makes a bank distinguishable from any other 
companies which trade for profit is the fact that banks lend the deposits made by 
depositors to other borrowers on another set of terms and conditions which normally 
would involve a higher interest rate than that repayable on funds deposited by a 
depositor. The difference between the interest paid to a depositor and that charged to a 
                                                 
11 Van Jaarsveld  “Domestic and International Banking Regulation and Supervision – Defying the       
Challenges” 2002 SALJ 80. 
12 Mülbert “Corporate Governance of Banks” 2009 EBOR  411 429. 
13 Mülbert “Corporate Governance of Banks” 2009 EBOR 429. 
14 Berger, Molyneux and Wilson The Oxford Handbook of Banking (2010) 1. 
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borrower, is where a bank generates its profit.15  Although explained in relatively 
simple terms it must be appreciated that banks have millions of similar transactions of 
both depositors saving funds and withdrawing funds and on the other hand borrowers 
who borrow these funds at a particular point in time. The volume of these transactions 
makes the management of a bank complicated and causes various risks to be 
associated with the role which a bank plays between the depositors of money and the 
borrowers of money. This has been the focus of bank supervisors and bankers alike 
throughout the world. The business of banks is not solely made up of lending 
deposits, but is expressed as their major function in this context. 
 
Banks can be distinguished from companies due to banks being subject to strict 
regulations in terms of capital levels and their exposure to risk, as well as in the 
corporate governance practices which are implemented in order to support the 
management of risk and capital levels. This shows that the corporate governance 
frameworks required in banks are markedly different to those of companies.16  
 
Banks are institutions in which the level of profit they generate is relative to the 
lending they do. The balance sheets of banks differ from other corporate entities in 
that the quality of a loan extended by a bank which should be reflected as an asset on 
its balance sheet differs from that of an asset on the balance sheet of a company due to 
the difference between the estimated value of a loan versus a fixed asset or tangible 
property. Another difference is that banks could be subject to a run. A run can be 
caused by small depositors, bondholders or by other banks in the market withdrawing 
their deposits within very short periods of each other and for these reasons banking 
regulation imposes certain limits or thresholds on the amount of risk which a bank 
may expose itself to.17 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Hudson The Law of Finance (2009) 729-730.  
16 Mülbert “Corporate Governance of Banks” 2009 EBOR  412. 
17 Mülbert “Corporate Governance of Banks” 2009 EBOR 421-422. 
12 
2.2.4 Areas of risks for banks  
Banks often fail because of the inaccurate calculation and perception of risks. Risks to 
banks exist in various forms, namely credit risk, systemic risk, fraud, money 
laundering, yield risk, market risk, operational risk and management risk.  
 
Credit risk to banks lies in the obligation of a bank to repay the full amount back to a 
depositor even though the loan which it made with the funds of the depositor were not 
repaid to it. This type of risk exists to a large extent due to the uncertainty which 
exists in placing a value on the assets of banks, which are loans. If loans made in 
terms of deposits are not repaid, it erodes the profits of banks and in some instances to 
such a severe extent that the bank will experience liquidity problems. Unlike the value 
of the assets of a bank, the liabilities of a bank are more readily ascertainable. For this 
reason banks are required to keep a “buffer” of capital available in order to make sure 
that the funds of depositors can be repaid in the normal course of business and even in 
circumstances of unexpected losses.18  
 
Systemic risk originates from the various relationships and links between banks 
through a payment system in terms of which banks send payment instructions to other 
banks during a specific banking day, at the end of which the payment instructions are 
settled and balanced. In the event that a bank fails to or is not in a financial position to 
settle its payment obligations at the close of a banking day other banks are in danger 
that they may in turn not be able to meet their payment obligations and this 
contributes to a domino effect.19 Banks are however in a position to protect 
themselves against the effects of this type of risk if they have implemented adequate 
capital maintenance measures and maintain a sufficient buffer to survive the financial 
impact which a bank may suffer in these situations. 
 
Another type of systemic risk is the risk that the public perception of a bank at a 
particular point in time may be that all other banks are in the same position as a bank 
which has failed and in reaction the public will move their deposits to banks which 
                                                 
18 Saambou curatorship http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/publication.nsf/APCV 
/ADACA838C01EB9E542256B61003497F1?opendocument (20-09-2010). 
19 Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2003) 67. 
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are in their perception the strongest. This is effected by depositors rushing to 
withdraw deposits, even if the banks perceived to be unhealthy are in actual fact 
perfectly healthy financially and a liquidity crisis may be faced by such banks which 
are perceived to be unhealthy in the event that there is a sudden rush by depositors to 
withdraw their deposits with the bank.20  
 
Runs on banks pose a significant risk to the well-being of banks, and can within a 
short period of time place a bank into a crisis. An example of a run is Northern Rock 
in the United Kingdom. This run was put into effect by depositors.21 The take over of 
Merill Lynch and the downfall of the Lehman Brothers were a result of a run which 
was caused within the banking market.22  
 
Fraud and money laundering as well as terrorism are significant risks to banking 
systems and the costs associated with a bank being either the victim of fraud, money 
laundering or terrorism is significant. The costs related to these occurrences are not 
only quantifiable in monetary terms but are a social expense too in that when a bank is 
the victim of fraudulent or criminal activities the monetary system is misused to 
further the objectives of criminals. Fraud can be characterised either by fraud which 
originates from inside a specific banking institution or fraud which originates from 
outside a bank. Examples of internal fraud includes the gradual payment of money to 
non-existent nominees or borrowers, and fraud from outside includes cheque, 
mortgage and credit card fraud.23 
 
Yield risk involves the risk that a bank may not be in position to produce sufficient 
income to cover payments for its liabilities. Market risk exists within the banking 
marketplace and could arise from fluctuations in price of certain financial instruments. 
Operational risk exists where a specific bank’s internal controls and procedures fail, 
being either from a cause which originated within a bank or from outside a specific 
                                                 
20 Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2003) 67. 
21 A run by small depositors is caused when a large amount of small depositors from the public within a 
short period of each other withdraw their deposits in the belief that that a bank may be declared 
insolvent; A run by the market is when banks who have inter-bank deposits rush to withdraw their 
deposits within a short period of time due to the belief that the bank may be declared insolvent. 
 
23 Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2003) 690-70. 
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bank. Management risk could exist in that managers or directors may not be entirely 
qualified for their positions and will not act in the best interest of a bank.24 
 
Banking supervision and the prudent regulation of banks has become even more 
important with the failure and rescues of multinational banking institutions during the 
world economic crisis. This has alerted the world to the considerable risks which are 
involved in the banking industry including the risks which banks pose to each other in 
their dealings on an international level and the importance of ensuring that banks are 
managed properly to guard against their failure.    
 
2.2.6 Bank Rescues 
Various approaches have been identified in rescuing banks on an international level 
and these will be dealt with in the various jurisdictions which will be assessed in 
terms of banking supervision. 
 
The impacts of bank rescues are felt on domestic capital levels and the existence of 
public doubt as to the economic controls which exist.  The impact which bank failures 
have on the capital levels of a country are mainly in the form of the deposits lost by 
depositors. In itself the supervision of banks to avoid bank failures is more than 
sufficient motivation to rescue a bank.25 The effects down the line are also to be 
considered especially in terms of the losses of deposits by companies which employ 
individuals. The importance of putting measures in place to avoid bank failures is 
especially important in countries where a culture of depositing funds with banks is 
widely observed and where all a depositor’s savings will be held by a single bank, 
making the role of a bank as intermediary between borrowers and savers all the more 
important. 
 
In some instances banks can be assisted out of a position of distress and the causes of 
a bank’s distress can be resolved by way of the application of funds to a short term 
                                                 
24 “Bank of England Basic Principles of Banking Supervision” http://www.bankofengland.co.uk 
/education/ccbs/handbooks/pdf/ccbshb07.pdf (15-09-2010). 
25 Van Jaarsveld  “Domestic and International Banking Regulation and Supervision – Defying the 
Challenges” 2002 SALJ  71. 
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liquidity crisis. The South African context this is where the South African Reserve 
Bank will for instance provide liquidity assistance as a “lender of last resort”. There 
are however specific requirements which have to be in place for the South African 
Reserve Bank to do this, for example that a bank guarantee has to be provided by a 
distressed bank before financial assistance is given.26 
 
A question which arises in the consideration of bank rescues is whether all distressed 
banks should be saved? A distinction can be drawn here between a bank which is 
experiencing a temporary liquidity problem and a bank which is already technically 
insolvent already.27  
 
It has been seen even in the South African context that bank rescue operations will not 
be invoked simply because the public’s deposits are at stake or for the public interest 
alone and Saambou Bank was rather placed under curatorship, than being rescued. 
 
The alternative to bank rescues is to ensure by proper supervision that banks have 
measures, standards and procedures in place and subscribe to best practice in order to 
be capable of withstanding any impacts on its business as well as the consequences of 
risk. This must have certainly been one of the motivating factors for banking 
supervision. I submit that this course of action has contributed to the strong banking 
system which exists in South Africa, and the continued implementation of best 
practice and preventative measures will only contribute to the resilience and 
foundation of any banking industry.  
 
2.2.7 Deposit Insurance and the associated moral hazard 
Deposit insurance has been identified as being one of the measures which could be 
put into place before the failure of a bank in order to protect depositors. 
 
                                                 
26 Saambou curatorship 
http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/publication.nsf/APCV/ADACA838C01EB9E542256B610034
97F1?opendocument (20-09-2010). 
27 Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2003) 94. 
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A deposit insurance scheme involves the collection of a premium from a depositor to 
protect against losses which may arise from the closure or failure of a bank. It has 
been expressed that deposit insurance can warp the “risk-reward” decision making 
process which is made by the management of banks and could affect market 
discipline which requires that banks must be well-managed. This type of insurance is 
invariably aimed at small depositors and will usually protect them up to a certain 
amount only. A deposit insurance scheme, if well-managed, can contribute to the 
confidence which the public may have in banks and significantly lower the effect of a 
bank failure on small depositors.28 In my opinion deposit insurance schemes are in the 
best interest of depositors, especially in light of the fact that the general public may 
survive on a daily basis off the funds which may have been deposited with a banking 
institution and may have been lost due to a bank’s failure. However, emphasis should 
remain on the proper and responsible management of banks and deposit insurance 
schemes should not be viewed as being a safety net and excuse for poor management. 
 
Deposit insurance has been identified as being a factor which may discourage banking 
regulators from rescuing banks.29 A great consideration in saving banks is the 
interests of the public who are depositors in banks, but an assessment must firstly be 
made as to whether the bank is capable of being rescued. A bank cannot just be 
rescued for the sake of protecting depositors and within a certain period of time after 
the rescue is implemented just fail because its rescue was not viable to begin with. 
This shows that various factors need to be taken into account when considering 
whether to intervene and save a bank.  
 
What follows is a broad inquiry into the development from Basel I up to and until the 
proposed Basel III and the need which established their formulation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Saambou curatorship 
http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/publication.nsf/APCV/ADACA838C01EB9E542256B610034
97F1?opendocument (20-09-2010). 
29 Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2003) 94. 
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2.3 Why Basel I? 
The first recommendations of the Basel Committee were a formulated set of 
principles, not publicly available at the time, which mainly advised that the duty of 
supervising international banking establishments in a specific country should be the 
mutual responsibility of the country in which the international bank finds itself and 
the country from which the bank originates. This document was referred to as the 
1975 Concordat and was later replaced by the 1983 Concordat which incorporated the 
principle of consolidated supervision.30  
 
The Basel Committee became increasingly concerned that the capital levels of major 
international banking institutions were declining while countries which were heavily 
indebted were experiencing growth and to this end moved towards a greater 
convergence in the manner in which adequate capital levels were measured. The 
failure of Bank of Commerce and Credit International contributed to this concern. The 
1988 Basel Accord was approved by governors of the respective reserve banks, and 
provided for a minimum ratio between capital levels and risk-weighted capital 
assets.31  
 
Criticism leveled at Basel I included that, although it introduced a straight forward 
risk weighting scheme which was transparent, it did not adequately account for the 
variances between various bank assets in that loans to big corporations would attract 
the same capital requirements as bonds which had a higher risk of default by 
borrowers. Another point of criticism is that mortgage bonds required the same level 
of capital regardless of the credit rating or credit score of a mortgagor. Treating all 
banks equally regardless of the risks which they took had the effect that banks which 
took higher risks were advantaged and could expect higher returns and at the same 
time not be required to hold extra capital due to their increased risk.32 
 
                                                 
30 Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2003) 105.  
31 “The history of the Basel Committee and its Membership” August 2009 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/historypdf (20-9-2010). 
32 Berger, Molyneux and Wilson The Oxford Handbook of Banking (2010) 358. 
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Basel I was never intended to be a document which would remain unchanged, but 
rather a document which would evolve and consequently various amendments have 
been made thereto.33 This is what is seen in the formulation of Basel II. 
 
Basel I paved the way for banks to comply with best practice and secure their 
existence. Basel I was most definitely a step in the right direction but required 
adaptation which would be suitable to large complex banks which is what Basel II 
was aimed at achieving. 
  
2.4 Why Basel II? 
The Basel Committee released a new capital Framework in June 2004, known as the 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised 
Framework which consisted of three pillars namely, minimum capital requirements, 
supervisory review of capital adequacy, internal assessment processes as well as 
required levels of disclosure which would improve discipline in the market and 
promote safe and responsible banking practices.34 
 
Basel II represented a major revision of the international standard of Basel I.35 Basel 
II application is to take place through consolidated supervision which means that any 
holding company of a bank, regarded as the “parent entity”, is responsible for the 
monitoring of risk for an entire banking group.36 
 
One difference between Basel I and Basel II is that Basel II offers a more holistic 
view of minimum standards. Basel II is a broader perspective and introduces three 
“pillars” which are aimed at being mutually enforcing. The first pillar deals with 
minimum risk-based capital requirements, the second pillar deals with guidelines for 
supervising the internal risk management of banks which also recommends that 
banking regulators recommend that banks hold capital levels higher than 
                                                 
33 “The history of the Basel Committee and its Membership” August 2009    
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/historypdf (20-9-2010). 
34   “The history of the Basel Committee and its Membership” August 2009 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/historypdf (20-9-2010). 
35 “Consensus achieved on Basel II proposals” www.bis.org/press/p040511.htm (21-09-2010). 
36 Meiring “Defining basel II  part II” 2008 Without Prejudice 12 12. 
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recommended in the first pillar to act as a buffer, and the third pillar deals with new 
public disclosure requirements which aim to increase transparency and promote 
increasing effective market discipline of adequate capital held by banks.37 
 
Resilience to financial shocks has become topical with the recent world economic 
crisis and assisting banks to withstand such shocks is the current focus of the Basel 
Committee in formulating Basel III. It is worth noting that although Basel II has been 
implemented in South Africa, this is not the case in all countries. For many countries 
Basel II will in all likelihood not be applied in time and the implementation of Basel 
III will take place instead once finalised. 
 
2.5 Basel III in the future 
The Basel Committee has embarked on a process whereby it seeks to improve on the 
framework set by Basel II, specifically by enhancing regulation, supervision and the 
management of risk within the banking sector. Basel III is seen as being a complete 
reform of the measures already implemented and aims to improve the resilience of 
banks during financial and economic stress.38 
 
A broad framework for Basel III was agreed on by the central bank governors and 
heads of supervision, which is the Basel Committee’s oversight body, in September 
2009 and concrete proposals were set out in December 2009. Basel III is seen as part 
of the Basel Committee’s continuous effort to improve the regulatory framework 
within the banking industry and builds on the standards set out in Basel II.39 
 
The proposed changes to Basel II aim to address identified shortcomings and to 
promote a banking sector which can enhance sustainable growth in the long term.  In 
light of the recent shocks to the world economy the quality of a bank’s capital has 
become even more important to ensure that banks are able to withstand events which 
threaten economic stability on an international level. This is referred to as being “loss 
                                                 
37 Berger, Molyneux and Wilson The Oxford Handbook of Banking (2010) 360. 
38 “International regulatory framework for banks (Basel III)”  http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (19-
9-2010). 
39 International regulatory framework for banks(Basel III)”  http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (19-9-
2010). 
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absorbing capital”. Further changes to Basel II include that all risks must be 
accounted for and the building of buffers in good economic circumstances to draw on 
during periods of economic stress is also recommended.40 
 
Taking into account the fact the Basel III is geared to make the banking industry even 
stronger to the shocks which it had suffered during the world economic crisis, it is 
clear that this was an underlying factor in deciding that Basel II had to be improved. 
 
The final version of Basel III is yet to be released, and thus commentary on its 
contents with certainty is not entirely possible at this stage, however, any attempt to 
improve the capacity of banks to withstand economic shocks will contribute greatly to 
the stability of the international banking industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 “Fundamentally Strengthening Regulatory Framework for Banks” http:// www.bis.org/ review/r 
100903a .pdf  (17-09-2010).  
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CHAPTER 3 
BANKING SUPERVISION AND THE IMPACT OF BASEL II ON 
VARIOUS JURISDICTIONS 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The then chairman of the Basel Committee Jaime Caruana said in a press release that, 
“Basel II introduces a far more comprehensive framework for regulatory capital and 
risk management than we have ever known”.41  
 
Banking supervision is dealt with differently around the world as well as in the 
jurisdictions under discussion. As will be seen the structure of banking supervision in 
the United Kingdom involves a system where three supervising institutions are 
involved. In South Africa the duty of supervising banks falls on a single institution, 
the Banking Supervision Department of the South African Reserve Bank, and in the 
United States of America is the duty of the Federal Reserve and certain government 
agencies.  
 
All three jurisdictions under discussion are members of the Basel Committee and thus 
have agreed to implement the principles and standards of Basel II.42 
 
Various jurisdictions can hardly be expected to approach and implement banking 
supervision principles in the same way, due to varying economic circumstances and 
approaches to banking as well as varying banking systems.  
 
In this chapter the basic nature of banking supervision within the United States of 
America, South Africa and the United Kingdom, as well as the impact of the current 
banking supervision framework (Basel II) on each jurisdiction will be assessed. 
 
                                                 
41 “Consensus achieved on Basel II proposals” www.bis.org/press/p040511.htm (21-09-2010). 
42  “The History of the Basel Committee and its Membership” http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (30-  
09-2010). 
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It must be kept in mind that the framework of Basel I is much less complicated than 
Basel II and thus the implementation of Basel II would have a much greater impact 
and be more difficult to implement.43 The impact which Basel II had on banks is far 
greater than Basel I for the reason that it affects the entry and operations of foreign 
banks into other countries and thereby also affects the negotiations which are coupled 
therewith.44 
 
The International Monetary Fund identified that a focus on speedy compliance with 
Basel II rather than ensuring a high quality compliance framework could pose a risk 
to implementation of Basel II but however indicated that the implementation of Basel 
II provides a unique opportunity through the diagnosis of current systems for even 
more improvement of the systems which were in place and would introduce the 
sharing of information between supervisors of different countries.45 
 
The procyclical impacts of Basel II have been considered on a wide level in that for as 
long as the rating systems of banks are designed to change with the risk of borrowers 
defaulting, the capital requirements of banks will rise in economies where there is a 
recession and decrease in economies where growth is experienced. The maintenance 
of macroeconomic stability was identified as an area which may pose a challenge in 
the implementation of Basel II.46 
 
The introduction of guidelines which effectively involve that capital requirements are 
more closely related to risks as measured by credit ratings have the effect that banks 
have to apply a standardised approach where capital requirements are based on 
agency ratings and more advanced banks are allowed to make use of internal ratings 
                                                 
43  Cornford ‘The Global Implementation of Basel II Prospects and Problems” http://www.g24.org/  
cornfor2.pdf (18-09-2010).  
44  Cornford ‘The Global Implementation of Basel II Prospects and Problems” http://www.g24.org/ 
cornfor2.pdf (18-09-2010). 
45  “IMF Executive Board Discuss the Implications of the new Basel Accord” http://www.imf.org 
/external/np/sec/pn/2005/pn05154.htm (15-09-2010). 
46 Berger, Molyneux and Wilson The Oxford Handbook of Banking (2010) 373. 
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based approaches which involve that the requirements are based on the outputs of 
banks’ own ratings systems.47 
 
When assessing the impact of Basel II on the mentioned jurisdictions, it should be 
borne in mind that many of the identified impacts could be common to all banks in all 
the identified jurisdictions, as all banks and supervisors of banks would have had to 
put systems and processes in place on how to comply with the requirements of the 
new framework individually. The procedures and implementation plans of various 
large banks in the various jurisdictions were assessed only in light of information 
which was available at the time of this study, and the mentioned banks may have 
implemented more procedures and measures during implementation of Basel II than 
that mentioned in documentation which is publicly available.  
 
Basel II has been the focus of many authors in terms of the implementation of Basel II 
and the obstacles which need to be overcome in doing so. Challenges in 
implementation have been identified for bank regulators as the implementation of the 
verification of systems which validate the ratings of banks as well as the monetary 
investment required for putting in place the required information systems 
infrastructure in order to be in a position to internally manage risks.48 
 
3.2 Banking supervision in the United States of America 
The central bank of the United States of America is known as the Federal Reserve 
System (Hereafter referred to as the Federal Reserve) and was founded by the United 
States Congress in 1913 in order to provide the country and its people with a safe, 
flexible and stable financial system.49 The establishment of the Federal Reserve was 
greatly attributed to various banking panics and financial instability in the economy in 
the early twentieth century.50 
 
                                                 
47  Benford and Nier “Monitoring cyclicality of Basel II Capital Requirements” http://www. 
bankofengland .co.uk/publications/fsr/fs_paper03.pdf (30-09-2010). 
48 Berger, Molyneux and Wilson The Oxford Handbook of Banking (2010) 373. 
49  “The federal reserve system, functions and purposes” http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pf.htm (30-
09-2010). 
50  Barnanke “The Federal Reserve’s Role in Bank Supervision” 
http://www.bis.org/review/r100318a.pdf (30-09-2010). 
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Prior to Basel I the responsibility of devising and implementing capital adequacy 
standards was that of the United States of America Congress. The duty was later 
transferred to the governors of the Federal Reserve through enactment of the 
International Lending and Supervision Act, which made it possible for the Federal 
Reserve to deliberate and negotiate on minimum international capital adequacy 
guidelines with other central banks and motivated the adoption of a uniform set of 
rules in this regard.51 
 
The Federal Reserve has a key role within the economy of the United States of 
America in relation to preventing and mitigating financial crisis, as a result of its 
powers in terms of being in a position to provide liquidity to the financial system, its 
role in the payment system of the country, its international relations with central 
banks of other countries and its responsibilities for macroeconomic stability.52 
 
The Federal Reserve System’s duties include conducting the country’s monetary 
policy, the supervision and regulation of banks to ensure the safety and soundness of 
country’s banking system, to protect consumers, maintain a stable financial system, 
control systemic risk and provide financial services to various stake holders.53 These 
duties are laid down in the Federal Reserve Act.54 
 
The Federal Reserve System has joint responsibility for banking supervision and 
regulation with a number of federal and state government agencies. These federal and 
state government agencies include the Securities Exchange Commission and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. State banks as well as foreign banks are 
supervised and in some instances also the foreign operations of banks of the United 
States of America.55  
 
                                                 
51 1983;see s 908(3)(c) ; 1993 
52 Barnanke “The Federal Reserve’s Role in Bank Supervision” http://www.bi s.org/review 
/r100318a.pdf (30-09-2010). 
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09-2010). 
54 1913; see s 11 
55  Barnanke “The Federal Reserve’s Role in Bank Supervision” 
http://www.bis.org/review/r100318a.pdf (30-09-2010). 
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The existence of various bank regulators has been identified as being a weakness of 
banking supervision in the United States of America.56 
 
The approach to bank rescues in the United States of America is said to be legalistic 
in nature due to the fact that the banking community is not involved to a great extent 
and the fact that the responsibility of rescuing banks is that of federal agencies, 
specifically the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and not that of the central 
bank, the Federal Reserve System.57  
 
There are perhaps too many institutions, with various mandates, involved in banking 
supervision in the United States of America which complicates matters. It has been 
seen in South Africa that a single independent bank regulator can be successful. The 
possibility exists that there could be a duplication of tasks if multiple parties are 
involved in the supervision of banks. 
 
3.3 Impact of Basel II on the United states of America 
The United States of America, specifically the Federal Reserve, shortly after 
agreement was reached on the methods of Basel II, issued regulations and rules 
through rule making initiatives similar to the provisions of Basel I applicable to its 
domestic banking system. There was not much refusal to accept the implementation 
of these regulations.58  
 
In the United States of America the New York Federal Reserve Board informed the 
twenty largest banks in the country by when to have implemented the internal risk 
based advanced approach. Smaller banks could decide whether they would implement 
Basel II. The date by which banks had to be in compliance with Basel II was delayed 
                                                 
56  Dam “The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and Comparative Perspectives” 
2010 Chicago Journal of International Law 10. 
57 Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2003) 96-97. 
58 Tarbert “Rethinking Capital Adequacy: the Basle Accord and the New Framework” 2001 Bus. Law 
767 789. 
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to January 2008 and only the largest banks in the country are rquired to comply with 
the provisions of Basel II.59  
 
The USA also followed a system whereby comments were received from all role 
players and considered for implementation.60 
 
The Bank of America in its 2008 annual report indicated that it aimed at full 
compliance with Basel II by the end of 2011. This is later than most. 
 
3.4 Banking supervision in South Africa 
The regulation and Supervision of banks in South Africa has been the responsibility 
of the South African Reserve Bank, which is the central bank of South Africa, since 
1920 through the enactment of the Currency and Banking Act,61 and was the duty of 
the Department of Finance of the South African Government before then. 62  
 
The main objective of the South African Reserve Bank is ensuring the stability of 
domestic price levels and the protection of the South African currency with an interest 
in the economic development and growth of South Africa on a level which ensures 
sustainability.63 
 
The South African Reserve Bank was established in order to remedy the poor 
financial and monetary conditions in South Africa after the First World War which 
                                                 
59 “Data Management Challenges for Basel II Readiness” http://www.it-observer.com/data 
management-challenges-basel-ii-readiness.html (27-09-2010) ; The Bank of America made it the 
responsibility of its audit and finance committee to oversee plans to implement Basel II within the 
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61Act 31 of 1920. 
62Van Jaarsveld  “Domestic and International Banking Regulation and Supervision – Defying the 
Challenges” 2002 SALJ  81. 
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led to the illegal outflow of gold from South Africa causing domestic banks to 
experience liquidity problems.64 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides for the role of the South 
African Reserve Bank, setting out its functions and object as the central bank of South 
Africa. The Constitution affirms the independence of the South African Reserve Bank 
and its interaction with government.65 
 
Supervision of banks in South Africa takes place through the Registrar of Banks by 
the control of the banking supervision department of the South African Reserve Bank. 
The South African Reserve Bank is regulated by the South African Reserve Bank 
Act.66 
 
The South African Reserve Bank maintains relationships with the Bank for 
International Settlements and participates in a number of its committees and forums, 
which includes the Basel Committee.67 
 
The approach which is followed in South Africa is that the financial system is the 
place where savings of the community are kept safe and thus requires protection. The 
fact that the duty of supervision of banks lies with the central bank of a country seems 
to be a model which is acceptable internationally.68 
 
In South Africa the existence of banks are regulated in terms of three enactments, 
namely the Co-Operative Banks Act,69 the Banks Act,70 and finally the Mutual Banks 
Act.71 The distinguishing factors in terms of the various types of banks which are 
                                                 
64 Van Jaarsveld  “Domestic and International Banking Regulation and Supervision – Defying the 
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28 
governed by the various enactments lies in the definition of the each type of bank, 
which will explained briefly.   
 
A co-operative bank is a bank whose members are of a similar profession and are 
employed by the same employer in the same business district or who have a common 
membership in an association or organisation or live in the same community in a 
specific geographic area.72  
 
A mutual bank is a juristic person registered as a mutual bank, whose members are 
shareholders of the bank and may exercise control as a shareholder at a general 
meeting of the bank.73  
 
In terms of the Banks Act,74 a bank is regarded as such in terms of the Act in the 
event that it conducts the business of a bank and solicits deposits from the general 
public.75  
 
The principles and recommendations made by the Basel Committee have been given 
legislative force in South Africa by the incorporation of its recommendations into the 
Banks Act.76 The Banks Act requires that the Registrar of Banks must be satisfied that 
the banking authority in the country of origin of a bank wishing to establish business 
in South Africa accepts and is committed to compliance with the proposals, guidelines 
and recommendations made by the Basel Committee.77 
 
The Banks Act,78 imposes certain sanctions on banks in South Africa should they not 
comply with or be unable to comply with the requirements of prudential supervision 
set out therein. The act also places an obligation on a bank to lodge regular returns 
with the South African Reserve Bank which indicate that it complies with the 
requirements in relation to minimum liquid assets, minimum capital, reserve funds in 
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respect of a banking group as well as minimum share capital and unimpaired reserve 
fund requirements. 
 
 3.4.1 Single Regulator 
A discussion paper was issued at the request of the Policy Board for Financial 
Services and Regulations in November 2000, known as the Falkena Report which 
dealt with financial regulation in South Africa. The Falkena report was to investigate 
whether a single regulatory agency for banks should be created, whether the South 
African Reserve Bank should have this responsibility in South Africa and whether the 
South African Reserve Bank should in addition to its duty to protect price stability 
also be responsible for promoting financial stability in South Africa.79 
 
The Falkena report identified three objectives of regulation. These objectives were 
securing systemic stability in the economy, ensuring institutional safety and 
soundness and promoting consumer protection.80 
 
Recommendations made in the Falkena Report included that the prudential regulation 
of banks and holding companies should be the responsibility of the South African 
Reserve Bank, while the supervision of all non-banking institutions should be the 
function of the Financial Services Board.81 
 
Van Jaarsveld was of the opinion at the time that in comparison to South Africa, the 
fact that a single regulatory authority was in place in the United Kingdom then did not 
mean that the same was fit for South Africa and the South African Reserve Bank. Van 
Jaarsveld made four recommendations and stressed the importance of having qualified 
supervisors, intense training in the financial sector, a wider range of powers for bank 
supervisors when requesting disclosure, accountability of managers and directors as 
well as avoiding the rescue of banks. Finally it was recommended that South Africa 
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should make use of its opportunity to learn from the international banking sector 
while being mindful of specific domestic requirements are in terms of banking 
supervision.82  
 
Within the context of banking rescues in South Africa the demise of Saambou Bank 
Limited (hereafter referred to as Saambou Bank) was a situation where the route of 
curatorship was rather followed than the lender of last resort option offered by the 
South African Reserve Bank.83 Saambou Bank was placed under curatorship on 9 
February 2002. At the time it had 520 000 depositors. The Minister of Finance at the 
time indicated in a statement to parliament that the decision to place Saambou Bank 
under curatorship was made after considering the fact that the running of a bank is 
more than just managing a business in the ordinary course, and the fact that the funds 
of depositors are managed by banks which is a very important social function 
requiring trust and confidence in banks. He emphasised that the decision to place 
Saambou Bank under curatorship was made in the public interest to stop the abnormal 
outflow of funds and to protect depositors’ funds due to a loss of confidence in the 
banking system. Curatorship was the mechanism identified as being the most cost-
effective in the situation, and also the most certain and immediate solution.84 
 
South Africa is a jurisdiction where the success of a single bank regulator is evident. 
The standards of banking supervision in South Africa are high and the South African 
Reserve Bank has responsibly and proactively discharged its duties as the central bank 
and supervisor of banks. This is also evident from the manner in which Basel II was 
implemented in South Africa. 
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3.5 Impact of Basel II on South African banking law  
When the implementation of Basel II became necessary within the South African 
context the banking supervision department of the South African Reserve Bank 
distributed a number of consultation papers intended to express their view on a 
proposed approach to the implementation of Basel II in South African banks. This 
process was intended to gain the perspective of banks and recommendations on the 
impacts and experiences which banks may have had during the process of 
implementation. 85 
 
Basel II was implemented in South Africa through the Banks Amendment Act.86 The 
Act sets out the following procedures for implementation of Basel II, being the 
clarification of the responsibilities and duties of banks, banking groups and members 
of the board of directors of the various banks, increasing the requirements for 
reporting and providing for comprehensive disclosure by banks and banking groups. 
Further amendments to the Banks Act also facilitated the calculation of minimum 
capital requirements for exposure to credit risk, market risk and operational risk.  
 
Basel II was implemented in South Africa on 1 January 2008 and its principles remain 
the objectives and guiding principles of the regulatory and supervisory framework of 
the South African Reserve Bank. The South African Reserve Bank continued to refine 
its Basel II revised regulatory and supervisory approach during 2008 and 2009 by 
focusing on internal capital adequacy assessment processes implemented by banks, 
reviews of credit, market and operational risk and the processing of applications by 
banks to make use of advanced approaches to calculate their minimum credit 
requirements in terms of credit and operational risk.87 
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The South African Reserve Bank held discussions within the banking industry on 
stress-testing frameworks which it rolled out and continued to internally improve its 
own knowledge base to effectively monitor the stress testing framework of banks.88 
 
The South African Reserve Bank assessed the readiness of South African banks for 
the implementation of Basel II in all banks, branches of foreign banks and mutual 
banks by issuing a questionnaire and arranged interfaces between banks to discuss 
issues which required clarification. 
 
In response to the implementation of Basel II by South African banks, the South 
African Reserve Bank indicated its support as affirmed under Basel I. The mission the 
Department for Banking Supervision to promote the soundness of banks through the 
effective application of international regulatory and supervisory standards was also 
affirmed thereby. The South African Reserve Bank appreciated that various changes 
had come about in the banking sector which involved the advancement of technology 
and that complying with the principles as set out in Basel II would be advisable and 
desirable for South African banks.89 
 
More specifically the enactment of the provisions of the new capital framework, no 
doubt required that the legislative and regulatory framework in South African had to 
be amended accordingly. The amendments in accordance with the framework take 
place on a level of legislation, the Banks Act,90 and the regulations thereto, as well as 
on the level of practice notes, directives and bank circulars which were issued in an 
attempt to provide guidance and procedures on matters relating to the banking 
industry. The Banks Act may only be amended by Parliament according to  
procedures prescribed, the regulations to the Banks Act may be formulated, amended 
and issued by the Minister of Finance. Practice notes, directives and circulars may be 
issued by the Registrar of Banks. 
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The banking supervision department of the South African Reserve Bank requested 
that all banks in South Africa perform assessments of their readiness for Basel II and 
compare their current internal regulatory systems with what was expected under the 
new framework in order to plan for the implementation. Banks were also asked to 
identify responsible persons for the management of the implementation process as 
well as the setting of deadline dates. A process of parallel runs was implemented as a 
transitional measure to facilitate the lodgment of returns under both Basel I and Basel 
II. The South African Reserve Bank made the necessary adjustments to its internal 
systems, specifically its information system database, and looked at approving bank 
approaches to credit and operational risks. It also developed its staff compliment to 
deal with the new challenges which Basel II brought about. The approach which was 
followed by the South African Reserve Bank for implementation of Basel II was a 
process of consultation and interaction between the various parties in the banking 
industry, namely the banks of South Africa, National Treasury, external auditors, the 
Banking Association of South Africa and the South African Reserve Bank.91 
It is evident that most banks in South Africa, especially the large banks, took the 
implementation of Basel II very seriously and the project plans involved spread over 
years and involved countless hours and hundreds of employees. What is encouraging 
about the South African implementation of Basel II is that it is ahead of many 
international banks, on which bigger economies rely, as far as the progress of 
implementation is concerned. Some countries will not even reach full compliance 
with Basel II in 2010. The responsible role of the South African Reserve Bank in the 
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timely implementation of Basel II must be recognised and has most definitely 
contributed to the strong banking system which exists in South Africa currently. 
 
3.6 Banking supervision in the UK 
Financial stability in the United Kingdom is a shared responsibility between the Bank 
of England, HM Treasury and the Financial Services Authority. 
 
The two core purposes of the bank of England are to ensure monetary and financial 
stability. Responsibilities of the Bank of England in respect of monetary stability are 
set out in the Bank of England Act,92 and its current responsibility for financial 
stability in the Banking Act.93  
 
In 1997 the Financial Services Authority was established with the power to supervise 
all financial activities in the United Kingdom through the Financial Services and 
Markets Act.94 During this time the Bank of England, the FSA and the HM Treasury 
formulated a Memorandum of Understanding in order to reach an understanding as to 
what each institution’s duties are. It was agreed that the obligations of the Bank of 
England are supervision of the monetary infrastructure of the financial system as well 
as the payment system. The Financial Services Authority is responsible for matters 
which pertain to regulation and HM Treasury is to maintain the legislative framework 
in terms of regulating banks as well as the general framework of this system. It also 
acts as a government department which entails the responsibility of fiscal, financial 
and monetary affairs in the United Kingdom.95  
 
Hudson is of the opinion that where more than one party is made responsible for the 
same task confusion is likely to manifest with regard to which party is responsible for 
what eventually leading to conflict and ineffectiveness. He makes this observation 
specifically in relation to what he calls the “tri-partite banking regulation system” 
which exists in the United Kingdom and adds that this unsuccessful system of three 
                                                 
921998. 
932009; “Bank of England Financial Stability Report June 2010” www.bankofengland.co.uk 
/publications /fsr/2010/fsr27.htm (19-09-2010). 
942000. 
95Hudson The Law of Finance (2009) 750. 
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functionaries was evident from the global financial crisis in the nationalisation of 
Northern Rock in 2007 and the failure of Bradford and Bingley in 2008, which 
required a takeover prompted by government motivation.96 
 
Uniform standards in banking have also received recognition in the European 
Community, of which the United Kingdom is a member. For example in that a bank 
of a certain member state may establish branches and provide banking services to 
other members states without requiring authorisation. This shows that all member 
states recognise the licensing processes of other member states together with their 
minimum standards. Even if the licensing processes of certain member state banks are 
not recognised there is at least assurance that minimum standards are complied with.97 
 
The directives of the European Community have been incorporated into the banking 
law in the United Kingdom and together with the rules incorporated in the United 
Kingdom, make up banking regulation.98 
 
Bank rescues in the United Kingdom occurred a number of times and a culture has 
developed where banks are now stepping away from rescuing fellow banks, the 
responsibility falling here on the Bank of England. No power of rescue exists in the 
Bank of England Acts,99 although the charters of banks give the Bank of England the 
power to contract which should include the power to step in and rescue banks. The 
Bank of England’s responsibility to rescue banks is supported by the Memorandum of 
Understanding which exists between it and the Financial Services Authority where a 
real threat of systemic risk is present.100 
 
The financial regulatory system of the United Kingdom will be reformed in the future 
and will move the regulatory framework which is currently in place to a system 
whereby prudential regulation of banks will be separated from oversight of consumer 
protection and market conduct, giving the Bank of England renewed duties with 
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regard to macroprudential regulation of the financial system in the United Kingdom. 
The process is aimed to be completed in 2012.101 
 
I agree with Hudson that the having three institutions involved in the supervision of 
banks in the United Kingdom could pose problematic, but this remains to be seen 
once the new structure of supervision is fully implemented and functioning. 
 
3.7 Impact of Basel II on UK banking law 
The Bank of England enacted standards in domestic legislation by amendments to the 
Bank of England Act similar to those of Basel I and member countries of the 
European Union, which includes the United Kingdom, caused that capital adequacy 
directives were issued by the Council of Ministers of the European Union, which dealt 
with solvency ratios and own funds.102  
 
Basel II implementation in the European Union will take place through the 
implementation of the Capital Requirements Directive which will act as a supervisory 
framework in the European Union similar to the capital measurement and capital 
standards reflected in Basel II.103  
 
In the United Kingdom the procyclicality of Basel II was seen as the process whereby 
the use of ratings to set capital requirements and improving on risk sensitivity 
requirements introduces risk that capital requirements and standards may fluctutate to 
a great extent with economic conditions. In reaction to this risk the Financial Services 
Authority and Bank of England formulated and implemented a system to monitor the 
trends in Basel II requirements before its implementation, in order to see a shift in 
requirements which could have the effect that banks are not sufficiently capitalised 
during periods where there is great growth economically or the capability of banks to 
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provide financial services during times of slow economic growth is affected 
negatively. The Bank of England identified that careful capital planning was required 
on implementing these principles.104 105 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
It is clear that Basel II had a great impact on various banking areas. Without any 
doubt the cost implications of aligning an entire banking group with the requirements 
of Basel II were significant. The development and adapting of information technology 
systems to comply with the measures which Basel II required were significant in light 
of the fact that these systems required adaptation on a global level and for various 
economic conditions where international banks operated. 
 
On a level of human capital, time and resources had to be invested in first becoming 
familiar with the requirements of Basel II and then implementing the required 
measures within in business units. Emphasis had to be placed on training of not only 
employees but the role players involved in managing the banks, namely the board of 
directors and executive management. 
 
Banks implemented and created various committees which had the responsibility of 
guiding the massive task of implementing Basel II throughout banking groups. Even 
committees of the board of directors within banks assumed responsibility and were 
kept informed of the developments with regard to implementation of Basel II. 
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A cost impact would no doubt also have been felt in the expenditure on consultancy 
fees, as banks are largely prone to appointing consultants to assist in various areas 
where the human resources of a bank do not possess the knowledge or skill base to 
implement and manage certain areas of business. Although there may have been 
significant costs for the banks, consulting companies would no doubt have seen an 
increase in revenue. 
 
Various information technology systems throughout the diverse global operation of 
banks required development in order to accommodate stress testing and so also where 
parallel runs were implemented by banks. 
 
Although the implementation of Basel II impacted on various business areas, it would 
however contribute to the safety of financial and monetary systems, to a greater extent 
than Basel I. Compliance with Basel II is an ongoing process which requires constant 
development, improvement and adaptation by banks.  
 
Through the investigation of the impact of Basel II, it becomes clear that the impacts 
are not only seen in the use of new systems in banks under Basel II, but even more so 
in the preparation required for Basel II. The impacts of Basel II are definitely not felt 
on a purely economic level.  
 
Compliance with Basel II will provide banks with far more than just compliance with 
the framework of Basel II but will have other benefits which will lead to improvement 
on various levels.106 The great efforts to implement Basel II, no matter how 
cumbersome, still contribute to the stability of banks and pose advantages to banks on 
many levels except pure compliance with what is required by this accord. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LEGAL NATURE OF BASEL II 
 
4.1 Introduction 
What is of great interest about the principles and recommendations made by the Basel 
Committee is the fact that so many countries implement and apply them, without the 
Basel Committee having any real law making authority. This could be as a result of 
the realisation that it is in the best interest of the global banking industry to implement 
prudent supervision rules. The wide implementation and recognition of Basel II could 
also be an indication that various bank supervisors from countries throughout the 
world take to heart their duties as the guardians of the financial systems increasingly 
seriously. One can only refer to the significant recent economic crisis for motivation 
as to why banking supervision is so important and why even more should be done in 
this field to combat financial shocks ruining banks and placing economies into 
recession. It remains to be seen what the true legal nature of Basel II is and whether it 
would be possible to classify the accord as a contract, treaty, trade usage or new lex 
mercatoria or whether Basel II could even resemble the characteristics of any one of 
these possible classifications. Finally the nature of Basel II will be considered in 
comparison to the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 600 
(hereafter referred to as the UCP).  
 
The level at which Basel II was formulated and released for implementation, as well 
as the incorporation of the recommendations and principals in various jurisdictions to 
enforce compliance, deserves consideration. 
 
 The Basel Committee lacks authority to enact law and the G-10 countries which 
ascribe to the principles and recommendations laid down by the committee will 
almost always incorporate the principles and recommendations into their domestic 
legal frameworks. This process is identified as being made up of four steps, namely 
the Basel Committee will firstly deliberate and draft proposals and recommendations 
for regulation, after which consultative papers will be issued which address the 
proposed changes and recommendations and comments will be received from role 
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players. These role players include banks, academics and governments as well as 
other interested parties. Once the process of receiving comments on consultative 
papers is complete the comments are assessed and the necessary changes are effected. 
The fourth step is where the member states of the Basel Committee agree to effect 
implementation of the changes or accords in their respective jurisdictions.107 
 
What separates the Basel Committee from law making bodies is the final and fourth 
step outlined above, and according to Tarbert despite the fact that the Basel 
Committee does not possess the ability or power to make law, it is in actual fact a 
“generator” of international standards on capital adequacy. The enactment of the 
recommendations made by the Basel Committee are simply formalities due to their 
wide application.108 
 
To a large extent the implementation and drill-down effect of the principles of 
banking supervision in the current framework depend on the cooperation of domestic 
structures as far as the implementation of and adherence to these principles is 
concerned. Whether countries choose to make compliance compulsory by legislating 
principles of Basel II, the enforcement of these principles is dependant on the extent 
to which the principles laid down by the Basel Committee are recognised by the 
banking supervisors or supervisory structures of a specific country. In my opinion the 
size and complexity of a country’s banking industry and whether domestic banks to 
business internationally will be considerations in the decision whether to implement 
Basel II. Implementation will be a priority to countries with an interest in the stability 
of its monetary and banking systems, this should actually include all countries. 
 
Freeland is if the opinion that since the endorsement by the G-10 Governors of the 
Basel Accords they have established a certain amount of persuasion behind the 
accords.109 
 
                                                 
107Tarbert “Are International Capital Adequacy Rules Adequate? The Basle Accord and Beyond” 1999-
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With Basel II recommendations not having any binding force, they are considered as 
being as being “soft law”, which refers to legal “terms” or “informal duties” adopted 
under terms of formal or informal treaties or multilateral agreements.110  
 
Soft law is regarded as undetermined standards which are agreed to and adopted by 
diplomatic conferences of international organisations or resolutions made by 
international organisations and intended to serve as  instruction for the manner in 
which to behave in terms of agreed issues.111 
 
The most successful regulatory proposals on banking supervision are said to be that 
created by the European Union which has incorporated principles and 
recommendations of the Basel Committee into its law by issuing banking directives to 
member states. This process has contributed to certain Basel II provisions having 
legal force and effect within the members states of the European Union and are in turn 
implemented either by the enactment of domestic legislation or are automatically of 
force in member states.112 
 
Some writers have referred to the enactments of the Basel Committee as being “club” 
law in light of the fact that they are carved out by a club of powerful nations, being 
the G-10 countries and more specifically that the process could be seen as, “the 
“inculcation” of formal legal systems by central bankers “club’ law”.113 
 
The documents issued by the Basel Committee are referred to as being “accords” and 
“concordats” due to their non-binding nature. Tarbert is of the opinion that this 
“divests” them from any binding legal authority but does show their political 
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significance.114 He is also of the opinion that the emergence of soft law is as a result 
of the shortcomings of “hard” law, which has binding legal authority.115 
 
Tarbert sees the soft law nature of the Basel Accords as being positive in that its 
nature sidesteps two real difficulties which include the possible lack of cooperation 
between nations and the difficult process to be followed in the enactment of 
international legislation. By not having to overcome the mentioned difficulties, in his 
opinion, banking regulators from various and very different banking backgrounds are 
in a position to work together under a single set of standards for banking issued by the 
Basel Committee.116 Tarbert identifies in the nature of the Basel recommendations 
that there is no risk of intrusion of national sovereignty and suggests that the Basel 
Committee could be a point of reference for models adopted for even further 
convergence on a level of other economic laws.117 
 
The recommendations made and principles set out by the Basel Committee are 
applied in more than one hundred countries and has over time been seen as 
international standards of best practice.118 
 
What follows will be an assessment of various types of possibilities of classification 
of Basel II either as an agreement, trade usage, a new lex mercatoria or a treaty. And 
finally the legal nature of Basel II will be compared to that of the UCP. 
 
4.2 Agreement  
In order to assess whether Basel II can be classified as an agreement it is necessary to 
consider the requirements for agreements in accordance with contract law. The law of 
contract as it stands in South Africa will be used as the point of departure. 
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The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa lays down the authority for the 
negotiating and signing of international agreements as well as its binding nature. Any 
international agreement is regarded as law in South Africa when enacted into law by 
the South African parliament. South Africa is bound by international agreements 
concluded before the enactment of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa.119 
 
At the outset it is necessary to appreciate the fact that contracts exist in various forms 
and in certain situations they are required to comply with certain formalities for 
validity. In order to establish whether Basel II is an agreement or contract it is 
necessary to investigate what the requirements are for the conclusion of a valid 
contract and compare these requirements with the nature of Basel II. 
 
An offer is a proposition which is made in terms of a party to a contract indicating 
that he wishes to enter into an agreement on specified terms.120 
 
A contract is normally created when an offer is made by one person and accepted by 
another.121 Thus a contract is characterised by the extension of an offer by one party 
and the acceptance by the party to who the offer was extended. 
 
The requirements for a valid agreement include that there must be consensus between 
the parties, the parties to the contract must have capacity to contract, performance in 
terms of the agreement must be possible, the conclusion of the agreement and the 
performance and object of the agreement must be lawful, the formalities for the 
agreement if any must be complied with and there must be clarity on the obligations 
created by the agreement.122 
 
                                                 
119 See s231 of Act 108 of 1996. 
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Consensus is made up of three elements namely agreement as to the outcome of the 
agreement, agreement as to the fact that the parties wish to bind themselves to the 
agreement in the legal sense and that both parties are aware that agreement has been 
reached between them.123 If this requirement is considered in light of the Basel II, it is 
clear that there is agreement as to the outcome of the agreement, there is also 
agreement as to the fact that the members of the Basel Committee will comply with 
the standards and principles formulated by the Basel Committee and the members of 
the Basel Committee are aware that other members are in agreement. 
 
Capacity to contract includes whether an individual has the capacity to enter into a 
valid contract and can be influenced by any number of factors, which include age and 
mental capacity. For the purpose of considering whether the members of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision have capacity to enter into agreement with each 
other, it will be presumed that they do have the necessary capacity and authority 
delegated to them by their respective governments. 
 
The validity requirement that the parties must be capable of performing in terms of 
the agreement, will be dealt with on the basis that the incorporation and application of 
Basel II will be possible in domestic legal systems. The application and 
implementation of Basel II within the various countries could be considered  
performance in terms of the agreement between members of the Basel Committee.  
 
The requirement of lawfulness, to conclude a valid agreement will be dealt with in 
light of the fact that the principles laid down in Basel II are lawful as they contribute 
to best practice within the banking industry and most definitely cannot be regarded as 
having unlawful consequences. 
 
Basel II will not be considered in light of or in comparison to whether it forms a 
specific contract, but rather whether it forms an agreement in the general sense, and 
the specific nature of a contract which may exist will not be considered in the current 
discussion. 
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The fact that there must be clarity as regards the obligations which the agreement will 
create implies that each party must know what will transpire from the agreement.  
 
The members of the Basel Committee do at the moment when they agree to the 
principles and the recommendations made by the Basel Committee and in driving 
application of the principles of Basel II acknowledge that they are aware of the 
consequences which should transpire from the agreement reached as members of the 
Basel Committee. This furthers a conclusion that Basel II could be regarded as a type 
of international agreement. 
 
As can be seen with the conclusion of many contracts, certain rights and duties are 
created but also certain remedies in the event of breach. The factor which steers me 
away from a conclusion that Basel II is binding contract is that non-compliance with 
the principles set out in Basel II cannot be remedied and that a member of the Basel 
Committee will not have any rights as such to either enforce compliance with Basel II 
or have a legal remedy available in these circumstances. Although I do recognise that 
Basel II is to a great extent a form of agreement, the fact that it is not enforceable 
either by penalty to a non-complying member or does not provide a remedy to an 
innocent party will not sustain a classification of Basel II as an agreement in the 
contractual law sense. 
  
4.3 Treaty 
Within in the realm of international law many customs are observed and agreements 
complied with but most countries desire to have a system which set out rules, or a 
framework of rules to be abided by in order for certainty and good order.124  
 
International law today is a significant departure from what it was in the middle of the 
last century due in part to the significant advances made in technology and the fact 
that a global community has been created. This is visible in trade relations and 
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interaction between nations from separate corners of the earth. Business has to a large 
extent also made the world a great deal smaller, thus effecting globalisation. 
 
A treaty is an agreement, in writing, which is concluded between states which 
functions within the realm of international law. A treaty can also be concluded 
between a state and an international organisation.125 
 
No substantive requirements exist for the conclusion of treaties and could even be laid 
down in letters between the parties or in minutes of gatherings, however most treaties 
are in some way similar to the form of an agreement.126 
 
International law has no law making body which can make enactments nor does it 
have a court system within which these enactments can be enforced. This is different 
from domestic law where enforcement is possible and a framework of laws are 
exists.127 
 
Both treaties and customs or international trade usage are sources of international law 
and their functions may overlap to a certain extent, as is indicated by Shaw in 
showing that treaties can for example repeat the rules and procedures which are 
observed and made up of customary law.128 
 
Treaties are regarded as being written agreements whereby states bind themselves to 
act in a manner agreed certain type of behavior or to establish rules for behavior in 
future relations with each other.129 
 
Treaties can be divided into treaties which are intended to be of universal application, 
and those which are to apply to the relations of a determined number of states. 
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Treaties are comparable to contracts in that they create obligations among states 
which are agreed to abide by.130 
 
Contractual treaties, legislative treaties and constitutional treaties exist either in the 
bilateral form, between two states or in multilateral form, between numerous states. A 
contractual treaty would govern for example dealings regarding trade or air landing 
rights. States establish a “legal relationship” in terms of contractual treaties. A 
legislative treaty is a treaty which concretises rules which already exist through 
customary international law, but are not binding on the parties to the treaty, and serve 
mainly as proof of the existence of a generally observed customary rule. A 
constitutional treaty would typically be a treaty which creates or establishes an 
international organisation.131 
 
Treaties are governed by the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969, which 
regulates the interpretation, termination and processes to be followed when entering 
into a treaty.132 
 
Treaties are seen as being superior to custom and aid the greater need which has 
arisen for some form of regulation between states as a result of the great 
developments in technology and communication.133 
 
Treaties are terminated by retraction by one of the parties, or where the treaty makes 
no mention one can argue that it is implied. Other instances are breach of the terms of 
a treaty or where there is a supervening impossibility to perform or the circumstances 
in which the conclusion of the treaty took place have drastically changed.134 
 
When one regards the nature of a treaty, specifically the intention to be bound to 
treaties in order to regulate the relations between states, the fact that they are 
agreements which are signed and assented to, or ratified, creating obligations between 
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them would lead me to conclude that Basel II does not comply with the classification 
of treaty. States can only be bound by treaties if they have assented to or ratified a 
treaty, which involves a conscious decision to be bound while creating obligations 
between states. In my opinion Basel II does not create obligations between states 
outright, but is rather a general agreement to apply certain standards and principles of 
best practice within members’ respective banking industries. 
 
4.4 International trade usage 
Due to the fact that international law has no binding judicial system, customs play an 
important role in international law.135 
 
Chapter 14 of the Constitution of The Republic of South Africa is dedicated to the 
role which international law plays in the South African legal system.136 Customary 
international law is regarded as law in South Africa unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an act of parliament.137 The recognition of customary international 
law in this fashion indicates the reality of customs and trade usage in South African 
and international law. Provision is also made for international law to play a role in the 
manner in which courts in South Africa interpret legislation. Legislation should be 
interpreted in a manner which prefers any reasonable interpretation in line with 
international law.138 
 
Customs are a product of behavior which develop within social groupings and are 
constantly or to a great extent observed by the members of these social groupings. 
Customs are normally not solidified by codification in a written set of 
pronouncements to be followed, but are followed on a continuous basis and evolve 
together with the social grouping which observes them.139 
 
In international law the permission of a state to be bound by a customary rule is 
implied and observed from the specific state’s conduct. The fact that conduct is a 
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determining factor within customary international law poses certain problems in terms 
of proving that a state has consented to a customary rule and therefore the 
requirements of settled practice and the acceptance of the duty to be bound are 
required to determine whether a customary rule exists in international law.140 
 
A custom could be regarded as being a type of tacit agreement whereby countries or 
states act in a certain way which in certain circumstances.141 
 
In order to conclude whether a custom is observed within a community one looks to 
indicators, which are embedded in the behavioral patterns of a social group or group 
which have something in common. In terms of international law, one would look at 
the behaviour of states.142 
 
The development of customary international law is a process which does not take 
place at once, but is developed over time and as behavior conforms or converges 
surrounding a specific issue or circumstances eventually forming a custom.143 
 
Settled practice or usus can be derived from the decisions of courts, legislation, 
comments by states, diplomatic correspondence and the opinion of national law 
advisers. The International Court of Justice has expressed that an alleged custom must 
be “constant and uniform usage” before it will qualify as a custom in terms of 
international law.144 Usually there is a requirement that a custom must have been 
observed for some period of time in order for it can be regarded as a customary 
rule.145  
 
A customary rule cannot be created solely by the presence of a settled practice and 
there must be a sense of duty that the parties are bound to a certain customary rule and 
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is observed as law. This element of the existence of a customary rule has a definite 
“mental” element of being bound.146 
 
Proving that the parties to an alleged customary rule have the sense of duty to be 
bound by it, and having regard to the fact that it is to a certain extent a mental 
element, means that proving the existence thereof is not entirely a simple task.147 
 
Shaw is of the opinion that customary law is founded on the actions of various states 
in terms of certain activities and in particular where these activities are similar, thus 
creating custom.148 
 
Proof of whether a custom exists can be found in various forms, for example 
diplomatic correspondence, official manuals on legal questions or in a patter of 
treaties or can be inferred from the recital of a treaty.149 
 
The nature of international law accommodates the changing of provisions fairly 
quickly without having to follow certain prescribed procedures.150 
 
Soft law, has the capacity to develop into international custom in the event that it is 
observed over a certain period of time and is observed as state practice, but until such 
a time it will exist as a guideline against which states can determine their conduct in 
respect of certain agreed issues.151 
 
Basel II does have evident similarities with the requirements and characteristics of 
international legal custom. It can be argued that Basel II and the manner in which its 
principles have been applied throughout the world could meet the requirement of use 
as it has been observed as the standard and best practice for banking supervision in 
general and that a certain period of time has elapsed in which the custom has been in 
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observance. Further the psychological element of being bound could be seen as the 
fact that countries, while not being bound thereto, will implement and apply the 
principles of Basel II in their domestic legal systems and banking industries. 
  
4.5 Lex Mercatoria 
The lex mercatoria has its origins in the early days of commerce and originated 
during trading activities between merchants from different countries who would over 
the world adhere to certain practices in doing business with each other.  Having its 
origins in Roman law, the lex mercatoria was spread around the world through 
Rome’s conquers, which was characterised by the observance of Roman law as the 
law which governed international commerce at the time. In this way the lex 
mercatoria became embedded in the regulations which were imposed by the Roman 
empire. During the middle ages the lex mercatoria moved back to being a commercial 
custom and was eventually introduced into domestic legal systems through 
nationalism. The twentieth century is characterised by the rapid and significant 
development of technology and communication and resulted in globalism.152 
 
A debate has been conducted for decades as to whether a lex mercatoria actually 
exists. The arguments against the existence of a lex mercatoria include that it has no 
methodical foundation, does not have the required procedural legitimacy, and that 
domestic legislatures and courts do not actually recognise its existence as well as that 
it does not have the quality of a of an “autonomous legal system”.153 
 
Wethmar-Lemmer is of the opinion that the lex mercatoria is a constantly changing 
phenomenon which exists in the international merchant community and that it is an 
autonomous legal system on its own providing a way in which the changing 
international world can be managed and regulated.154 The notion that the lex 
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mercatoria is not a fully “operative system” and thus cannot function, is dispelled by 
the introduction of domestic legal rules as residual rules of the lex mercatoria.155 
 
It makes sense to business people in this century to agree and enter into conventions 
and laws which are made up of customs which have been developed over time.156 
 
Dalhuisen does acknowledge the existence of a new lex mercatoria and indicates that 
it is less “systematic, “less concrete” and embodies a manner of thought which 
accepts “rules as being guidelines”.157 
 
With the existence of the lex mercatoria since the beginning of trade on an 
international level, it has been changing constantly in line with commercial 
developments and movements as well as with the way in which “merchants” have 
conducted their trade. Trade practices have undergone a phenomenal change since the 
first existence of the lex mercatoria.158 
 
Dalhuisen indicates that if it is assumed that an “independent international legal 
order” exists in terms of which international commercial and financial transactions 
function it must be established what law will take precedence in this “order” and how 
it can be found and what the hierarchial structure is of these laws.159 
 
Trade practices are embodied in the Uniform Rules of Commerical Practice (here 
after referred to as the UCP) which applies to letters of credit. The possibility exists 
that the UCP does not fully incorporate all the trade practices appliccable to letters of 
credit and must be added to by first explaining the rules in the UCP from their 
respective systems, by looking at general principles applied in the most significant 
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countries and as a last “resort” referring to domestic laws with reference to the 
conflict of rules on a discretionary basis only. In Dalhuisen’s opinion this process has 
the result that domestic laws become a part of the “transnational” lex mercatoria and 
through this process no longer exist as domestic laws.160 
 
In my opinion whether Basel II could be regarded as a new lex mercatoria requires 
consideration of the type of commercial dealings which it affects. Basel II is widely 
observed between banks over the world and certain banks will not do business with 
each other unless they subscribe to the requirements and principles of Basel II. If 
bankers are to be regarded as the merchants and Basel II as the trade practice, it could 
be argued that Basel II does perhaps in its application on such a wide level constitute 
a new lex mercatoria. The principles and recommendations of Basel II have 
developed over time from the origin of Basel I and have changed and adapted since 
then. 
 
I do agree with Wethmar Lemmer that the lex mercatoria does exist, for the reason 
that the commercial world have implemented and do observe their own customs in 
their dealings with one another and that it will exist as phenomenon especially in 
international law for as long as international trade takes place and for as long as 
business is done between people on a global level. The existence of a modern lex 
mercatoria can most definitely not be denied, and the making of rules on an 
international level in light of globalisation has become a reality in the business world 
today.  
 
I am of the opinion that an argument could be made out for the acceptance of Basel II 
or even the pronouncements of the Basel Committee to be regarded as a new lex 
mercatoria for the reason that it is a set of rules which are observed widely between 
bankers within the banking industry and in my opinion can be seen as having 
developed into a set of rules which bankers abide by not only internally within banks 
but also in their dealings with other financial institutions. 
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4.6 Comparison between the legal nature of the UCP(Uniform Code of 
Commercial Practice 600) and Basel II 
While Basel II is an accord which applies to the supervision of banks the UCP applies 
to and governs the issuing of letters of credit and are formulated by the International 
Chamber of Commerce. 
 
In international trade payment can be effected in any number of ways, namely by way 
of an open account, bill of exchange, documentary bill or by way of a letter of credit 
also known as a documentary credit.161 
  
The International Chamber of Commerce aims to encourage international trade, 
services and investment by removing obstacles which may stand in the way of free 
flowing commercial transactions and is governed by a constitution.162 
 
The UCP is described as “rules” which apply to a documentary credit when it 
provides in it that it is applicable thereto and are binding on all parties to the letter of 
credit unless specifically stated that the rules of the UCP are excluded.163 
 
A letter of credit is characterised by agreement between a buyer to make payment to a 
seller through a reliable bank on presentation of documents which are compliant with 
the terms and conditions of credit advanced. The buyer is referred to as the 
“applicant” and the seller is referred to as the “beneficiary”.164   
 
There has been a decline in the observance of the UCP over the years, but it still plays 
and integral role in international commerce. This decline is ascribed to escalating 
                                                 
161Carr International Trade Law 2005 470. 
162“Constitution of the International Chamber of Commerce 
“http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/ICC_Home_Page/pages/ICC_Constitution_EN_8_June_
2009.pdf (28-11-2010) 
163International Chamber of Commerce ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 
2007 Revision 2007 17 
164Carr International Trade Law 2005 473. 
56 
bank charges, and increase in the rejections of the letters of credit and differing 
interpretation of the rules in various jurisdictions.165 
 
The UCP is a type of convergence on an area of international trade and commerce and 
from the outset requiring that its rules be enacted into domestic law by these 
countries.166 South Africa has not incorporated the rules of the UCP into domestic 
legislation.167 In South Africa the parties to a letter of credit can decide whether South 
African private international law or the rules of the UCP must apply to their 
relationship, thereby choosing a “legal system” to govern their dealings.168 
 
The UCP has been described as rules for documentary credits implemented by 
“international banking practice and mutual agreement between international 
bankers”.169 
 
The UCP has undergone a number of revisions, mostly to bring it in line with 
developments in various areas of commerce and industries.170 
 
The UCP is related to banking law and consequently the International Standard 
Banking Practice for the Examination of Documents under Documentary credits was 
formulated incorporating “international standard banking practice”.171  
 
When one considers the nature of Basel II and that of the UCP 600, the following 
observations are evident. The Basel Committee is for Basel II what the International 
Chamber of Commerce is for the UCP 600, and these bodies are entrusted with the 
task of formulating the rules applicable to these rules or standards. The composition 
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of the Basel Committee is dissimilar to that of the International Chamber of 
Commerce in that members may be representatives of corporations,172 and the 
composition of the Basel Committee is representative of bank supervisor 
representatives from various member states. Neither the International Chamber of 
Commerce nor the Basel Committee possesses any law-making authority. 
 
Basel II and the UCP are similar in that compliance with the rules set out therein are 
not mandatory and are applied on a voluntary basis. A further difference lies in the 
fact that Basel II is a formulation of best practice on banking supervision for banks as 
a whole and the UCP is a formulation of rules which govern a specific relationship 
which exists within a component of banking law and trade. The rules of the UCP and 
Basel II are both non-binding. 
 
The indication that the rules of the UCP must be incorporated into domestic 
legislation in order for mandatory compliance is similar to the position under Basel II. 
The enactment of various provisions of Basel II into domestic legal systems has taken 
place, as well as in terms of the UCP. 
 
Although there has been a decline in the observance and application of the UCP, the 
observance and application of the Basel Accords has increased. This may be ascribed 
to greater pressure placed on banks to comply with the principles of Basel II, as many 
banks will not do business with banks if they are not compliant or observe the rules of 
the accord. As set out above there remains a choice as to what “legal system” should 
apply to a letter of credit. 
 
As with the UCP various revisions have been made to Basel II to keep up with 
developments. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
In my opinion the only possible classifications which are closely possible to the 
nature of Basel II are that of being either a new lex mercatoria or international trade 
usage. 
 
The classification of Basel II as a contract is not possible due to no remedies being 
available in law as well as enforcement of obligations not being possible between 
members of the Basel Committee. 
 
The debate which surrounds the existence of a lex mercatoria is in my opinion not 
realistic in light of the clear customs which are followed by persons who conduct 
business with each other on an international level, as well as the fact that various 
industries choose to maintain a set of rules which they observe internationally in 
commercial dealings with each other. In my opinion support could be found for the 
existence of a new lex mercatoria within the global banking industry and could be 
regarded as a possible classification for Basel II. 
 
Classification of Basel II as a treaty seems untenable as obligations are not created 
between states. 
 
The fact that soft law can develop into custom and trade usage supports an assumption 
that Basel II could be categorised as such in future, in the event that the requirements 
for international trade usage are proven and established sufficiently. 
 
The ideal would be that banking supervision would begin with the enforceable 
regulation of banks on an international level and that these regulations would then 
trickle down to a national and domestic level.173  
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CHAPTER 5 
BASEL II AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The financial crisis which came about in 2007 proved what an integral role banks play 
in any economy.174 
 
The financial crisis originated with the sub-prime housing market collapse and then a 
loss of confidence in Western banks which lay within global imbalances in trade and 
capital availability between advanced and emerging economies.175 
 
In response to the financial crisis the Basel Committee indicated that it is working 
towards strengthening the current supervision measures in place under Basel II. In 
their deliberations as to how Basel II can be strengthened they agreed that 
development was necessary with regard to capital requirements and the quality of 
capital which had to be held. The new measures and standards would be known as 
Basel III, and would result in higher capital and liquidity requirements for banks, less 
effects of procyclicality and greater resilience of the banking industry to stress factors 
as were experienced during the financial and banking crisis.176 
 
The Basel Committee has expressed its opinion that better regulation is not enough 
and that the promotion of financial stability requires a broad framework, as well as 
macroeconomic policies and market discipline. The financial crisis has shown the 
importance of banking supervision and the implementation of policies of prudential 
supervision. We must steer clear of the attitude that certain banking institutions are 
too large to fail and promote adequate risk management and disclosure on all levels. 
The financial crisis did bring to light a number of shortcomings in relation to the areas 
of governance, risk management and due diligence which the private sector, in 
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particular banks, shareholders and investors and other market role players have to 
address.177 
 
Basel II has been criticised as not having prevented the banking crisis of 2008, some 
are of the opinion that Basel II did not exist for long enough or had not been 
implemented for long enough in order to have sufficient opportunity to prevent the 
crisis.178 
 
Lessons which could be learned from the economic crisis include closer international 
co-ordination in terms of macro-economic policy, establishing better rules for cross-
boarder financial crises, strengthening the resilience of banks and developing macro-
prudential tools.179 
 
5.1 Basel II, the world economic crisis and the United States of America  
The most significant effect or actually the cause of the financial crisis in the United 
States of America was the sub-prime crisis which came about in relation to sub-prime 
mortgages. The sub-prime mortgage crisis which was experienced in the United States 
of America later spilled over to the rest of the world.180  
 
The banking crisis in the United States of America had an impact on other countries 
due to the fact that financial institutions in other countries bought securities which 
were issued by financial institutions in the United States of America secured by 
mortgage bonds over properties in the United States of America.181 Not only were 
small depositors affected by the sub-prime crisis in the United States of America, but 
some of the most advanced and largest banks in the world had purchased securities 
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from these banks with the aim of making higher returns and perhaps with inadequate 
investigation.182 
  
A sub-prime mortgage is a mortgage loan to a borrower with insufficient or “sub-
standard” security. This type of mortgage loan is usually extended to borrowers who 
have bad credit records or do not have stable levels of income and would normally not 
be able to source a loan from a bank. There is compensation for these types of 
mortgage loans, being an increased cost due to the increased rate of risk which is 
taken by a lender in advancing the loan in such circumstances.183 
 
The increase of defaulting payments of subprime borrowers culminated in the loss of 
value in terms of mortgage backed assets. Credit risk and liquidity problems caused 
many large banks to take large “write downs” and eventually led to insolvency and 
also exposed many companies to risk.184 
 
The response of bank regulators in the United States of America to the subprime 
crises included that a subprime lender must obtain approval from a regulatory 
authority and they encouraged that banks must rather price their subprime loans in 
terms of the risk than on the rates that institutions in competition with them are 
charging.185 
 
The fact that banks make use of depositors’ funds to invest, and the fact that 
significant losses were felt on mortgage backed securities, had a great impact of the 
capital levels of banks, which either resulted in banks being declared insolvent or 
being unable to lend. 
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The banking and financial crisis became even worse with the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers and the conflicting decision to save Bear Stearns, which is just a small 
investment bank in relation Lehman Brothers. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers is 
said to have had a marked impact on the confidence in interbank markets and made 
clear that no bank in the United States, including the very largest were safe from the 
financial crisis.186 
 
The banking crisis in the United States of America is the most significant and 
damaging crisis since the Great Depression and without a stable banking system the 
risk of another Great Depression was considerable.187 
 
The financial crisis and the rescues evident during the crisis have raised the query that 
perhaps financial institutions other than banks should be regulated in a similar fashion 
to banks.188  
 
5.3 Basel II, the world economic crisis and South Africa 
During the world economic crisis the South African Reserve Bank maintained its 
objective of ensuring that the domestic banking system in South Africa remained 
sound by way of efficient compliance with international regulatory and supervisory 
standards.189 
 
The effects of the international economic crisis worsened the environment within 
which banks had to operate consequently evidencing a decline in the rate of growth in 
loans and advances by banks and increasing the pressure on consumers. The pressure 
felt by consumers could be seen in the rise in defaults on loans having an impact on 
the profits made by banks.190 
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The former Governor of the South African Reserve Bank indicated in his address to 
the annual general meeting of the South African Reserve Bank that despite the world 
economic crisis, the South African banking system remained stable and that banks 
were holding adequate levels of capital.191 
 
It is evident that South African banks felt the impact of the world economic crisis to 
some extent with lower levels of lending and increased levels of bad debts. No banks 
had liquidity problems or required monetary support from authorities. South African 
banking supervisors and the South African Reserve Bank implemented prudential 
measures even before the financial crisis manifested. These measures included “fit 
and proper” assessments and training of executive and non-executive directors, 
focusing on high quality management of risks in banks and implementing minimum 
capital requirements which were higher than that prescribed.192 
 
The South African Reserve Bank commissioned an independent review of all 
securitisation schemes in which domestic banks were involved to determine whether 
prudential management of the schemes was being implemented in response to the 
world economic crisis, and no material issues were identified during the review.193 
 
Prudent regulatory and supervisory networks in South Africa assisted it to weather the 
financial crisis fairly well.194 Most of these networks had been put in place in 
complying with Basel II. 
 
5.4 Basel II, the world economic crisis and the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom is identified as one of the countries which has been hit the 
hardest by the world economic crisis.  
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The world economic crisis was characterised by the failure of Northern Rock one of 
the largest banks in the United Kingdom caused by a run.195 The run on Northern 
Rock, was different to the type of run which would normally be expected in that there 
was no “pattern of coordinated failure”. The run which placed Northern Rock into a 
liquidity crisis was not a run which was specifically aimed at Northern Rock only. 
Another difference between the normal bank run and that which was experienced by 
Northern Rock is that the run was not caused by ordinary small depositors, but by 
major investors in the bank.196 What is notable is that the run experienced by 
Northern Rock was not in anticipation of a possible liquidity crisis but came after a 
liquidity crisis had been identified.197 
 
Northern Rock was an institution which was highly geared, and by this reason was 
more vulnerable to impacts from changing conditions in terms of lending.198 
 
Northern Rock made use of short term debts to finance long term assets, which is the 
usual manner in which banks operate and this makes it difficult for an institution to be 
properly “hedged”.199 
 
The global financial crisis was also characterised by bank failures in Europe, showing 
that the crisis which originated in the United States of America was of a global nature 
and impacted other countries to a great extent.200 
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5.5 Conclusion 
The fact that average level of capital required by Basel II proved to be inadequate, the 
cyclicality of the capital requirements in terms of Basel II, the fact that the assessment 
of credit risk is done by institutions which are not banks (ratings agencies) and the 
possible conflicts of interests involved therein as well as assuming that the internal 
models of banks for measuring risks are advanced have been regarded as some of the 
responsibilities which Basel II had in the recent financial crisis.201  
 
In defense of Basel II’s alleged contribution to the financial crisis, the implementation 
of Basel II was postponed in the United States of America to 2010 and only the 
largest banks in that country will be required to comply therewith. Smaller banks in 
the Unites States of America can elect whether or not to implement and apply Basel 
II. The use of Basel II by banks in 2007 was restricted at the time that the financial 
crisis took place and most banks observed the Capital Requirements Directive of the 
European Union, implementing Basel II in the European Union, allowing 
postponement of Basel II implementation until 2008. It is for these reasons the United 
States of America and European Union felt the impact of the economic crisis under 
the requirements and principals of Basel I and were not protected by the improved and 
strengthened principles of Basel II at the time when the crisis manifested. Even 
though banks were only protected by Basel I in the sense of the financial crisis, many 
banks had already started readying themselves for implementation of Basel II and had 
to this end adapted and reviewed their credit processes to prepare themselves for 
Basel II requirements.202 
 
Some authors are of the opinion that Basel II did not have an integral part in the 
banking and financial crisis, bearing in mind that the regulatory shortcomings during 
the crisis were rather in relation to Basel I than to Basel II, coupled with the fact that 
Basel II had largely not yet been implemented in many countries are to be considered 
before attributing blame to the Basel Committee and Basel II. Basel II could not be 
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expected to have curtailed unregulated intermediaries within the investment market or 
guarded against high gearing and irresponsible assumption of risks.203  
 
Various other elements have been identified as contributing factors to the financial 
crisis namely the rules of liquidity of banks which highlighted sub-standard crisis 
management between countries as well as the supervision of banks in domestic legal 
systems or in countries not being efficiently applied.204 
 
Defective regulation was only one of the contributing factors to the financial crisis 
and the impact of the crisis on a global level required that it be dealt with on a 
macroeconomic level. The G-20 countries attempted to do this but only produced 
general agreement on certain matters which lacks the backing of permanent staff 
compliment to continuously work on the points on which the G-20 nations reached 
agreement.205  
 
What is however clear from the shocks and impact of the financial and banking crisis 
is that Basel II does require strengthening and this has been realised by the Basel 
Committee in its work on Basel III, mainly aiming at making the banking industry 
resilient to financial shocks which it could experience.  
 
One of the significant lessons of the world economic crisis in my opinion would be 
that although certain measures were not adequate in prohibiting the crisis, the focus 
should be on constantly improving current regulatory frameworks and best practice 
for the banking industry. The world economic crisis has not affected the great 
importance of the prudential supervision of banks and the integral role of banking 
regulators, banking supervisors and international cooperation. 
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